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1  | INTRODUC TION
Human adults perceive others as intentional agents and attribute 
thoughts, beliefs and intentions to them, which helps to explain and pre-
dict the behaviour of others (Gummerum & Chu, 2014). Understanding 
others’ intentions is fundamental for legal systems, sport competitions 
and many other of our daily interactions. Furthermore, reading inten-
tions might be especially important in the context of reciprocal cooper-
ation, where individuals help those that are cooperative (Trivers, 1971). 
Reciprocity is a strong determining factor for human behaviour; we 
reciprocate with familiar and unfamiliar partners on an almost daily 
basis (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In order to only cooperate with helpful 
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Abstract
One way to cooperate with others and avoid exploitation is reciprocal cooperation. 
Reciprocity is the selective helping of those who were cooperative before, which 
is commonly based on outcomes. Yet, outcomes may not reflect intentions, that is 
if an individual is unable but willing to help. Humans, including children, show such 
intention- based reciprocity. However, it is unclear whether other animals consider in-
tentions in reciprocal settings. Here, I tested whether Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) 
reciprocate help based on intentions by manipulating the outcome while keeping the 
partner's cooperative intentions the same. Subjects experienced a partner that was 
able to help by providing food via a movable platform. In another condition, the same 
partner was unable to help because the platform was blocked. When the roles were 
exchanged afterwards, subjects provided food more often to “able” than “unable” 
partners, even though the latter attempted to help. I compared these findings to data 
using “willing” and “unwilling” partners that were able to help. Again, rats based their 
cooperative behaviour on outcomes rather than the intention to help. This suggests 
that rats reciprocate primarily based on outcomes and seem to not consider coopera-
tive intentions. Although subjects provided consistently less food to partners that 
did not help, they provided them with some help. Potentially, rats use a cognitively 
less demanding strategy by helping defectors a bit to maintain cooperation. Thereby, 
cooperation might be resistant to situations in which an apparent defector was actu-
ally unable to help, but had cooperative intentions and might be a good cooperation 
partner in the future.
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partners, and avoid exploitative ones, we usually evaluate the kind-
ness of an action and not only its outcome— based on intentions (Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006). Indeed in economic games, participants always 
reward and almost never punish those with good intentions in contrast 
to those with bad intentions, even if the outcomes do not differ be-
tween those with different intentions (Charness & Levine, 2003; Falk 
et al., 2003). This motivation to reciprocate based on intentions ex-
tends from monetary to non- monetary favours (Chao, 2018) and from 
direct to generalised reciprocity, which is a general motivation, after 
being helped, to help not only your helper but anyone (Sun et al., 2020). 
Intention- based reciprocity can also explain why we are less likely to 
trust and reward people, who only help because they strategically plan 
to receive a favour in return compared with those who give because of 
kindness (Orhun, 2018).
Intention- based reciprocity might also exist in non- human an-
imals. Many animals show reciprocal cooperation (Díaz- Muñoz 
et al., 2014; Schino & Aureli, 2010; Schweinfurth & Call, 2019; 
Taborsky, 1994; Taborsky et al., 2016). However, outcome- based 
reciprocity, that is help based on the consequence of an action, 
might be too rigid for cooperation to evolve. For example, if an indi-
vidual is hungry and begging for food, but their partner has no food, 
it might be important to realise that this partner is not generally un-
willing to cooperate, but simply unable at this occasion. In the future, 
this partner might be able and willing to help and thus might be a 
good cooperation partner. Hence, making predictions about future 
interactions with a partner based on intentions might be better than 
on outcomes, which can be determined by external factors that are 
out of control of the partner. Intention- based reciprocity has been 
shown to be evolutionary stable in theory because it enables indi-
viduals to engage in enduring mutual cooperation (Fishman, 2006).
While such a strategy based on intentions provides benefits, 
it might also involve costs, for example in terms of greater cogni-
tive demands. In order to read the intention of another agent, one 
must understand (i) that the partner has a goal towards which she 
is acting, (ii) the partner's ability to act according to the goal and (iii) 
the end state of an action, that is whether the partner has reached 
that goal (Tomasello et al., 2005). Thereby, intention reading en-
ables understanding the motivation to help based on the ability to 
ascribe mental states to others, that is theory of mind (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). For example, the same outcome of an action could 
be interpreted as getting rid of, moving, returning, trading, sharing or 
giving a piece of food (cf. Tomasello et al., 2005).
In line with this, only a handful of animals have been suggested to 
respond to intentions of human experimenters, which may comprise 
the reading of behaviours and minds. These include primates (reviewed 
in Krupenye, 2021) such as great apes (Kano & Call, 2014), capuchin 
monkeys (Phillips et al., 2009) and Tonkean macaques (Canteloup & 
Meunier, 2017). There is also evidence in other species, for example in 
grey parrots (Péron et al., 2010) and horses (Trösch et al., 2020). That 
intention reading is a complex trait is also highlighted by the fact that 
children gradually increase this skill (Behne et al., 2005; Hamlin, 2013; 
Liu et al., 2019). Interestingly, although children can read intentions 
relatively early in their ontogeny, they cooperate mostly based on 
outcomes compared with teenagers and adults, who cooperate more 
based on intentions (Sutter, 2007). Still, even though they mostly re-
spond to outcomes, children can consider intentions. Under some cir-
cumstances, they help unable more than unwilling partners (Dunfield 
& Kuhlmeier, 2010) and avoid helping partners with harmful intentions 
(Vaish et al., 2010). The enhancing effect of complex cognitive skills, 
including intention reading, on the evolution of cooperation and vice 
versa, has been recognised repeatedly (Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Moll & 
Tomasello, 2007). Given the ubiquitous occurrence of cooperation 
throughout the animal kingdom, it is hence not unlikely to find inten-
tion reading also in other animals during cooperation.
The only study to date on intention- based reciprocity in animals, I 
am aware of, investigated predator mobbing behaviour in neighbouring 
pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca). These birds were more likely to 
help neighbours that were unable to help on a previous instance, be-
cause they were caught by the experimenters, than seemingly unwill-
ing neighbours that were also caught but alarm calls were played back 
(Krams et al., 2013). This shows that the birds seem to interpret and ex-
cuse their neighbour's defection, either based on ability or intentions. 
At present, both possibilities can, however, not be disentangled.
Thus, this study asked whether individuals base their recipro-
cal decisions on outcomes, intentions or abilities to help. Norway 
rats (Rattus norvegicus) are the ideal candidate to test this idea. 
Rats are highly social and show complex social cognitive skills 
(Schweinfurth, 2020), including emotional contagion (Atsak 
et al., 2011) and emotion reading (Nakashima et al., 2015). In recent 
years, they have also turned into an important model organism for 
cooperation. Rats have a high propensity to cooperate (Oberliessen 
et al., 2016) and reciprocally exchange, for instance food (Rutte & 
Taborsky, 2007) and allogrooming (Schweinfurth et al., 2017) with 
their conspecifics. Over 20 studies using various paradigms showed 
that rats provide more help to partners that helped them com-
pared with partners that did not help them in the past (reviewed 
in Schweinfurth, 2021). As previous studies used specially trained 
partners, it remains unclear, however, whether rats understand the 
intentions and abilities of their partners or whether they respond 
purely to the outcomes of their partner's action.
Here, I aim at separating outcomes from intentions or abilities 
by testing whether rats differ in their responses towards able versus 
unable conspecifics, both of whom exhibited cooperative intentions. 
If rats’ decisions are guided predominantly by others’ intentions, rats 
should help both partners equally often. If guided predominantly 
by the outcomes, rats should help “able” partners more often than 
TA B L E  1   Overview of the subjects’ experience before they 
could return favours
Ability Intention Outcome
Able Willing Help received
Unable Willing No help received
Able Unwilling No help received
Note: Partners were either able or unable to help and willing or unwilling 
to help.
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“unable” partners. Furthermore, I compared this to earlier results on 
partners that were able but unwilling in order to separate outcomes 
from abilities. If rats evaluate partners primarily based on their abil-
ity to help, they should help able and unwilling partners more often 
than unable and willing partners, although both showed no help. 
However, if rats help based primarily on outcomes, they should make 




This study investigates helping behaviour in outbred Norway 
rats that were descendants of wild- caught individuals (source: 
Animal Physiology Department, University of Groningen, the 
Netherlands). The subjects of this study were adult (563– 571 days 
old) females, weighing between 256 and 408 g. The rats were 
housed in same- sex groups of five individuals. Twelve groups 
were housed in one room, and the groups had limited visual but 
acoustic contact with rats of other cages. The cages (80 × 50 cm 
and 37.5 cm high) were enriched with a (non- monopolisable) 
wooden house, sitting board, salt block, hiding tunnel and a piece 
of wood to nibble. They were provided with litter and hay as 
bedding material. The cages were cleaned, and the bedding ex-
changed once a week. Food (conventional rat pellets) and water 
were provided ad libitum, and the rats were never food- deprived. 
In addition, the rats received a snack, which was a grain mix, in 
the afternoon four times a week and fresh fruits or vegetables 
twice a week. All rats were carefully accustomed to handling right 
after weaning and arrival at the facility and thus showed no signs 
of stress when being picked up or transported. Testing took place 
in a separate room. The ambient temperature of the housing and 
testing room was 20 ± 1°C, with a relative humidity of 50%– 60%. 
The light:dark cycle was set to 12:12h with lights on at 8p.m. and 
30 min of dawn and dusk. The study was conducted during the 
day under red light. The subjects were not selected but were all 
available animals at that time, and the rats were randomly as-
signed to their role (i.e. subject or partner). In addition, the test 
order of the subjects was randomly chosen, but the order was 
kept the same in both conditions, so that rats were tested at the 
same time of the day.
2.2 | Pre- experimental training
In order to participate in this study, the rats were trained to use the 
food exchange apparatus that was established by Rutte and Taborsky 
(2007). The apparatus consisted of a movable platform (grey PVC) on 
a wooden table. The platform was connected to a stick. By pulling 
the stick (about 0.14N), the platform moved into the experimental 
cage (80 × 50 cm and 37.5 cm high) that was divided into two equally 
sized compartments by mesh. The training followed an established 
training protocol (for more detail, see the comprehensive descrip-
tion of Dolivo and Taborsky (2015)). In summary, the training was 
divided into two phases. In the first phase, all rats learned to use 
the platform by pulling food (here an oat flake) towards themselves 
(all rats received 11 sessions). Thereafter, the rats entered the sec-
ond phase of the training, receiving 18 sessions. Here, every rat was 
paired with a cage mate. Pulling the platform provided food only to 
their training partner but never to the active rat anymore. The roles 
were exchanged, and the delays between role reversals were gradu-
ally increased, that is from role reversals directly after one donation 
to role reversal after seven minutes, that is the experimental time.
2.3 | Experimental procedure
Every subject rat (n = 27) experienced the same familiar partner 
(n = 25, two partners used twice) in two conditions on two different 
days, consisting of one experience and one test phase, respectively, 
following a within- subject design. In the “able" condition, every sub-
ject rat experienced a partner that was able to help by providing 
food via the movable platform for seven minutes, which the subject 
and partner rats were familiar with from the pre- experimental train-
ing. In the “unable" condition, the partner was unable to help the 
subject rat for seven minutes because the experimenter blocked the 
platform with a piece of rope that was visible. Thus, the platform 
could not be moved and could not deliver food to the subject rat, 
although the food was visible. Every experience phase was followed 
by a test phase (seven minutes) in which subject rats could provide 
food to their partner. I noted down how often subject rats provided 
food to their partner. As a measure for the unable partner's inten-
tion to help, I also recorded whether partners tried to help by pulling 
the stick that was fixed to the immobile platform. I had to exclude 
eight rat dyads as the partner did not attempt to provide food in the 
unable condition, and it was thus unclear whether the partner was 
perceived as “unable” (n = 19). Note that including those dyads did 
not change the results.
To investigate whether subjects respond to the ability to 
help or the outcome, that is help received or not, I compared the 
data to archival data, using the same rat cohort (Schweinfurth & 
Taborsky, 2020). Here, subjects (n = 21) experienced trained coop-
erators (n = 6) that were “willing” and trained defectors (n = 6) that 
were “unwilling” to help, respectively. Importantly, cooperators and 
defectors were able to help, that is the platform was not blocked. 
The experimental protocol was the same as above.
2.4 | Statistical analyses
All tests were done in R (version 3.6.0) with RStudio, using the pack-
age “lme4.” To test whether rats differentiated between partners 
that were able or unable to help, I calculated a generalised linear 
mixed model (command: glmer) for the donation rate, assuming a 
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Poisson distribution. Experimental condition, that is able and unable, 
was included as fixed factor. Some rats were used as partner and as 
subject, but never twice as a subject rat. To correct for multiple test-
ing, the identities of the subject (nested with their cage) and partner 
identity was included in the models as random effects. The model fit 
was assessed visually with the help of Q- Q plots and the residuals 
were normally distributed (Shapiro– Wilk normality test: W = 0.98, 
p =.69), suggesting a good model fit. To disentangle ability from 
outcomes, I conducted pairwise comparisons, using the Wilcoxon 
signed- rank tests for paired (able and willing versus able and unwill-
ing) and the Mann– Whitney U tests for unpaired data (able and un-
willing versus unable and willing).
3  | RESULTS
Subject rats distinguished between both conditions and provided 
more food to “able” food- providing partners compared to “unable” 
partners, which could not provide food as the device was blocked 
(Generalised linear mixed model: β = −0.48 ± 0.17, n = 19, p = .004, 
Figure 1a). Subjects helped able and willing partners more often than 
able and unwilling partners (Wilcoxon signed- rank test: V = 128.0, 
p = .015, Figure 1b). No difference could be detected between able 
but unwilling and unable but willing partners (Mann– Whitney U test: 
U = 222.0, p =.58, Figure 1a,b).
4  | DISCUSSION
Rats distinguished between a partner that was able to help in one and 
unable to help in another condition by providing food more often to 
the able partner. Importantly, the unable partners attempted to help 
by pulling the stick that was connected to the blocked platform, sug-
gesting that they had cooperative intentions. Thus, rats seem to not 
consider their partner's intention to help but base their decision on 
outcomes or abilities to help. The responses reflect those of rats who 
encountered specially trained partners that were willing or unwilling 
to help. Those trained partners differed in their intention, but not in 
their ability to help. Again, subjects provided more help to those that 
helped them in the past, suggesting that ability to help cannot explain 
their response either. In a direct comparison, the subjects showed no 
difference in helping an unable, but willing compared with an able, 
but unwilling partner. Taken together, this suggests that rats evaluate 
their partner's cooperativeness predominantly based on outcomes 
and not on their partner's intention or ability to help.
If rats base their decisions predominately on outcomes, how do 
they make sure to not categorise an unable partner with cooperative 
intentions as a defector, which can have dramatic effects on future co-
operation. When potential cooperators are not recognised as cooper-
ators, reciprocity can lead to the loss of cooperation over evolutionary 
time frames (Stevens et al., 2011). This is mainly because reciprocal 
strategies, such as tit for tat, are not overly forgiving or flexible. If a 
partner has failed to cooperate once or was incorrectly memorised as 
a defector, the other individual stops cooperating with this partner. 
Consequently, this partner is lost as a future cooperation partner. To 
mitigate this problem, rats might use a different strategy that is help-
ing defectors a bit, but less than cooperators. Thereby, their strategy is 
more flexible and less prone to losing future cooperation partners that 
have cooperative intentions, but that are unable to help on a specific 
occasion. In fact, in all published studies on cooperation in rats, they 
rarely showed zero help towards unwilling defectors, but help cooper-
ators significantly more often than defectors that receive a bit of help. 
This effect was found in female rats (Rutte & Taborsky, 2008), male rats 
(Schweinfurth et al., 2019), related and unrelated rats (Schweinfurth 
& Taborsky, 2018b) and even when they exchange grooming for re-
ceived help in this task (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2018a). This strat-
egy might be cognitively less demanding as only outcomes need to be 
assessed. A model using flexible investments showed that a contin-
uous response can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, especially 
when there are few interactions, as expected for a short- lived animal, 
like rats (Killingback & Doebeli, 2002).
Further studies could clarify whether rats are not able to read 
intentions or are able but do not use them in this cooperative con-
text. For example, the used paradigm might have been challenging 
F I G U R E  1   Donation rate of subject rats towards partners that 
differ in ability and intention Subject rats provided food by pulling 
a stick (see picture) more often to partners that helped them 
previously compared to partners that did not help. Thereby the 
outcome of actions explained their donations best in comparison 
to the partner’s ability (+ indicates being able to help, - being 
unable to help) or intention to help (+ being willing to help, - being 
unwilling to help). Panel (a) shows the donations of subjects 
towards partners that were generally willing to help but differed 
in whether they were able or unable to help. Panel (b) shows the 
donations of subjects towards partners that were able to help but 
differed in whether they were willing or unwilling to help. The 
boxplots depict the median and interquartile range as box and the 
lower and upper quartile as whiskers
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for rats to understand. Although the unable partners attempted to 
provide food by pulling the blocked platform, which was audible 
and visible, subject rats might not understand that the platform 
was blocked. While this is possible, I think it is rather unlikely be-
cause (i) when the platform was blocked eight partners did not 
even attempt to pull it and (ii) rats have been shown to have good 
physical cognition in similar tasks. For example, rats use and ma-
nipulate pulling tools and understand which tools are functional 
(Nagano, 2019; Nagano & Aoyama, 2016). Still, conceptual rep-
lications, which are testing the same concept by using different 
means (cf. Nosek & Errington, 2020), could clarify whether the 
finding that rats predominantly use outcomes for their coopera-
tive decisions is due to the here used task or due to the coopera-
tive context.
There are two additional paradigms that have been commonly 
used to assess intention reading in other species. One paradigm 
requires subjects to copy a demonstrator who performs an un-
usual action that in one condition can be explained by an external 
factor or not in another condition, like switching off a lamp with 
the forehead when the hands are tied or free. Children copy the 
action more often, if the experimenter's hands are free, suggest-
ing some goal understanding (Gergely et al., 2002). Rats are highly 
sensitive to the actions of conspecifics and are known to copy oth-
ers (Galef & Laland, 2005). Hence, a version of this task might be 
possible. However, such copying tasks require the identification of 
causally irrelevant components and a lack of over- imitation, which 
might come with challenges in itself (cf. Whiten, 2019). Another 
paradigm compares the subjects’ response to an intentional or 
accidental situation, like placing or dropping a marker on a food 
container to indicate the food location (Call & Tomasello, 1998). 
This might be a more promising next step. In the current study, 
rats might have been able to understand their partner's intention, 
but they did not use intentions in cooperative contexts. The in-
tentional/accidental paradigm yields direct benefits to the acting 
individual, and hence, subjects might be more motivated to use 
their knowledge about intentions. Developing several paradigms 
for rats might clarify whether rats generally cannot read intentions 
or might not use them for cooperative decisions.
In conclusion, this study suggests that rats base their decision to 
reciprocate predominately on cooperation outcomes rather than on 
their partner's intentions or abilities. By using a buffering system of 
helping defectors a bit, but considerably less than cooperators, rats 
might use a cognitively less demanding strategy to reciprocate help. 
Whether rats are unable or unwilling to use intentions in cooperative 
decisions should be subject to future studies.
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